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WAIVER OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPISTPATIENT PRIVILEGE: IMPLICATIONS
FOR CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION
Marcia M. Boumil†, Debbie F. Freitas†† & Cristina F. Freitas†††

ABSTRACT
The psychotherapist-patient privilege, rooted in both common and
statutory law, is predicated upon the public policy goal of protecting
the reasonable expectation of privacy of individuals seeking psychotherapy. The privilege is not absolute, however. State and federal
courts are far from uniform in determining how and when the privilege should be waived, in whole or in part, through implication, inadvertence or the affirmative action of the parties. In the family law
context, the law that has evolved around the exercise of this privilege
is even more complex as the needs of children add another wrinkle to
the goal of balancing the imperative of confidentiality with the need
for useful information that may be provided.
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INTRODUCTION
In family court matters, particularly those involving contested
child custody, allegations of impaired mental health or parental unfitness frequently lurk in the background.1 Since child custody is generally based upon the best interests of the child, allegations of impaired
mental health must be addressed.2 Furthermore, even where there are
no preexisting psychological issues, it is not unusual for warring couples to seek out psychotherapy, which, scholars note, plays a “rehabilitative role in helping family members cope with the changes that
divorce inevitably brings [as well as] . . . personal and . . .
intrafamilial conflicts.”3 Despite their important role in helping families cope with these issues,4 the presence of psychotherapists in the
lives of family court litigants creates fertile ground for inquiry when
litigation ensues. In both state and federal courts, psychotherapistpatient communications relating to the individual’s diagnosis or
treatment enjoy some level of privilege from disclosure in court proceedings.5
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute. Depending
upon the court and the circumstances, the privilege may yield to such
interests as the court’s need for the information to protect the welfare
1
Courtney Waits, The Use of Mental Health Records in Child Custody
Proceedings, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 159, 159 (2001).
2
Id. at 159-60.
3
Id. at 159.
4
Id.
5
See e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 2000 & Supp.
2011).
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of a child;6 it may also be compromised by the patient’s own waiver,
whether voluntary, inadvertent or implied.7 This Article provides a
multijurisdictional examination of the complex issues surrounding
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and its implications in
child custody litigation. It reviews cases in which waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been implied by such circumstances
as disclosure of privileged communications to third parties, by prior
testimony, and by the presence of third parties. It examines matters in
which courts have found limited, partial, or selective waiver of the
privilege. It also discusses the presence of a guardian ad litem (GAL)
appointed in matters of contested child custody to assess the best interest of the child and its impact on asserting the psychotherapistpatient privilege of both parents and children.
I.

IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE

In Jaffee v. Redmond, the U.S. Supreme Court, in establishing a
federal standard for psychotherapist-patient privilege, acknowledged
that the success of the psychotherapeutic process requires a high level
of confidence and trust in the privacy of communications between
psychotherapist and patient.8 Jaffee specifically analogized the psychotherapist-patient privilege to that of the attorney-client9 and spousal10 privileges, noting that all are “rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust.”11 However, Jaffee also acknowledged that,
“like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the
6

See, e.g., id. § 20B(e).
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996); see also § 20B.
8
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10. Although this article focuses on the contours of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, it should be noted that privileges also exist for
individuals who obtain treatment from other licensed mental health providers including social workers, marriage counselors, etc. See id. at 15 (“We have no hesitation in
concluding in this case that the federal privilege should also extend to confidential
communications made to licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy. The
reasons for recognizing a privilege for treatment by psychiatrists and psychologists
apply with equal force to treatment by a clinical social worker.”).
9
Note that under the Federal Rules of Evidence there is a spousal “privilege” (that can be asserted or waived) while in some state courts spouses are “disqualified” from testifying against their spouses, which disqualification cannot be waived.
See FED. R. EVID. 501 (advisory committee notes).
10
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which originated in common law and
exists in all states, the psychotherapist/patient privilege is a creature of statute and
thus varies from state to state. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B(e);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c(b) (West 2011).
11
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
7
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protection”12 of the privilege. Furthermore, because the privilege is
not self-executing, it can be inadvertently waived by the patient (but
not the psychotherapist)13 if not affirmatively asserted and preserved.14
A.

Implied Waiver by Filing a Claim

Implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, as the
name suggests, does not require that the patient/litigant affirmatively
authorize the waiver. Rather, an implied waiver may result if, for
example, a party alleges mental injury or emotional distress in her
pleadings.15 Further, even if a party does not make a claim for emotional distress, she may expect discovery of privileged information if
subsequent pleadings (such as interrogatories), affidavits, deposition,
or other testimony raise issues of mental or emotional injury. The
threshold determination of implied waiver of the psychotherapistpatient privilege by filing of a claim is whether a party has put her
mental or emotional condition in issue.16
Not all claims of emotional distress, however, will result in an
implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Significantly,
some courts distinguish between mere “garden variety”17 claims of
emotional distress that are incidental to the action, and those claims in
which a party has genuinely put her mental or emotional condition in
issue.18 In In re Sims, the Second Circuit ruled that mere gardenvariety claims for emotional distress or general statements about feel-

12

Id. at 15 n.14.
See In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 566-67 (Cal. 1970); see also Catharina
J.H. Dubbelday, The Psychotherapist-Client Testimonial Privilege: Defining the
Professional Involved, 34 EMORY L.J. 777, 778 (1985).
14
Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 780 N.E.2d 453, 458 (Mass. 2002); see also
Adoption of Carla, 623 N.E.2d 1118, 1121 (Mass. 1993) (“Since the existence of the
privilege alone does not disqualify a psychotherapist from testifying, a party desiring
to exercise the privilege must make an attempt to do so at trial.”); Adoption of Vartan,
67 Mass. App. Ct. 1107, No. 06-P-615, 2006 WL 2739698, at *1 (2006) (order pursuant to Rule 1:28) (holding that, where mother failed to object to admission of four
psychological evaluations at trial, the mother could not later assert that she had unknowingly waived her patient-psychotherapist privilege).
15
See Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 170 F.R.D. 127, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding that litigant waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by placing her
emotional or mental health at issue in her pleadings).
16
See id.
17
Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 194 F.R.D. 445, 449
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
18
Kunstler v. City of New York, 242 F.R.D. 261, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
13
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ing anxious or depressed may not waive the party’s psychotherapistpatient privilege:
[A] plaintiff does not forfeit [the psychotherapistpatient] privilege by merely stating that he suffers
from a condition such as depression or anxiety for
which he does not seek damages; . . . a plaintiff may
withdraw or formally abandon all claims for emotional
distress in order to avoid forfeiting his psychotherapist-patient privilege; and . . . a party’s psychotherapist-patient privilege is not overcome when his mental
state is put in issue only by another party.19
In Commonwealth v. Goldman, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a party does not relinquish his psychotherapist-patient
privilege merely by talking about events that were the subject of a
privilege.20 Specifically, the court distinguished between “two distinct scenarios [: i]n the first, a witness testifies as to events which
happen to have been a topic of a privileged communication[; i]n the
second, the witness testifies as to the specific content of an identified
privileged communication.”21 Only in the second scenario would the
privilege be waived.22 Similarly, in Cohen v. Cohen, a court of appeals in Florida held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is only
pierced when the patient “rel[ies] on his mental or emotional condition as an element of his claim or defense.”23
B.

Implied Waiver by Previous Testimony

Implied waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege can also
occur inadvertently through previous testimony. Depositions are a
key example of implied waiver by testimony. Prior to a deposition,
the parties often agree that all objections, except those pertaining to
the form of a question, should be reserved until trial.24 This “usual

19

See In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 134 (2d Cir. 2008).
See Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1026 (Mass. 1985).
21
Id. at 1027.
22
Id.
23
See Cohen v. Cohen, 813 So. 2d 1060, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(emphasis added); see also Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 745 A.2d 1054, 1073 (Md.
2000) (holding that the mere filing of a custody action does not place a parent’s mental health into issue such that the psychotherapist-patient would be forfeited).
24
Diana S. Donaldson, Deposition Essentials: New Basics for Old Masters,
LITIG., Summer 2000, at 25, 26.
20
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stipulation”25 shortens depositions while also allowing a broader range
of discovery questions without forfeiting the right to later object.
Claims of evidentiary and testimonial privilege, however, are viewed
differently from objections and must be affirmatively asserted at every
stage of the proceeding or they are waived.26 Thus, a general reservation of deposition objections does not allow a party to later determine
that a communication was privileged and therefore claim that it should
be retroactively protected. Further, once a witness “waives his [therapeutic] privilege . . . [he] may not withdraw his waiver to prevent matters which he has already gone into from being explored in greater
detail.”27
Parties who submit documents or testify in a deposition about certain communications with a psychotherapist can be found to impliedly
waive their psychotherapist-patient privilege, even when it occurs
during the course of a different legal proceeding. This can occur
when a party attempts to assert her privilege either as to different
communications with the same psychotherapist, or as to the same
communications in a different proceeding.28 As to the latter, in State
v. Langley, for example, the Oregon Supreme Court held that a defendant waived his psychotherapist-patient privilege when he voluntarily disclosed a significant part of those communications by submitting privileged documents in an earlier trial.29 Thus, where a party
voluntarily testifies in a deposition or prior proceeding about conversations, documents, or advice rendered during a presumptively privileged psychotherapeutic session and does not assert his privilege, the
court may find that the privilege has been waived.30
As to the former, if a party lists his psychotherapist as a potential
expert to be called at trial,31 or indicates his intent to admit a psychotherapist’s treatment records into evidence, or discusses some limited

25

Id.
See Cary B. Cheifetz, Deposition Strategies: Minding Your Q’s & A’s, 21
FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1998, at 12, 12.
27
In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 136 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Carthan
v. Sheriff, 330 F.2d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1964)).
28
Matthews v. Super. Ct., No. B208007, 2008 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
6976, at *10-12 (2008); Koch v. Cox, 489 F.3d 384, 388 (2007).
29
State v. Langley, 839 P.2d 692, 704 (Or. 1992).
30
Heller v. City of New York, No. 06-CV-2842, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117684 (E.D.N.Y Apr. 11, 2008), aff’d, No. 06-CV-2842, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59334 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., No. 92-CV9243, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10212, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1993).
31
See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Colo. 2004);
Adams v. Ardcor, 196 F.R.D. 339, 344 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
26
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aspect of his mental health treatment,32 the court is likely to find that
the privilege has been impliedly waived. The reason for implied
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is one of fairness and
sometimes referred to as a matter of “sword and shield”: parties cannot admit into evidence that part of a psychotherapist’s communications which are favorable to his position (the “sword”) and thereafter
claim privilege (the “shield”) when inquiry upon cross-examination is
made into related matters.33
Privileged material from a psychotherapist may be admitted without objection in one judicial forum, only to resurface in future unrelated litigation where one of the litigants seeks to preserve its privileged
status. Indeed, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that since the
“subject matter was the same and a significant part of that subject
matter was disclosed when . . . admitted during the earlier trial[,] . . .
[the] [d]efendant’s privilege to keep the communications confidential
was waived.”34 Therefore, allowing information from a therapeutic
source to enter litigation may have broad and permanent implications
for the parties, extending far beyond the current litigation. In the federal arena, a similar result can be expected. Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically contemplates that parties submitting to psychological examinations waive any privileges they may
have “in that action or any other action involving the same controversy.”35 Some scholars have interpreted the language of the rule to
mean that “[i]n effect, the rule provides that a release to one person
regarding the plaintiff’s condition is a release to all regarding the
same condition.”36
C.

Determination of Waiver

The determination of whether or not a party has waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege, directly or impliedly, is within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.37 The standard for appellate re-

32

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clancy, 524 N.E.2d 395, 396-97 (Mass.

1998).
33

See Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (N.Y. 1989).
Langley, 839 P.2d at 704.
35
FED. R. CIV. P. 35(b)(4).
36
See Stuart A. Greenberg, Personal Injury Examinations in Torts for Emotional Distress, 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 233, 240
(Alan M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003).
37
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17 (explaining that a trial judge must evaluate the “relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and the evidentiary
need for disclosure.”); see also In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 1987).
34
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view of this determination is abuse of discretion.38 A trial court will
only be held to have abused its discretion if it “base[s] its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.”39 This determination may be made by a review of motions
or pleadings that specifically address the issue. For example, if a party testifies at a deposition about privileged communications with her
psychotherapist, the trial judge may review the deposition transcript
(with or without countervailing evidence) and determine whether or
not the party has waived the privilege.
There are some circumstances in which implied waiver can only
be determined by review of the psychotherapeutic records to determine whether they contain privileged information. In this case, an in
camera review (outside of the presence of counsel) by the trial judge
is generally required.40 For example, if a party’s own medical records
are put into evidence, and she later alleges that the records contain
privileged psychotherapist-patient material, the records may require in
camera review. In P.W. v. M.S., the Massachusetts appeals court held
that, upon assertion by a party that his medical records contain privileged material, the trial judge must review the records in camera to
determine whether the privilege applies, or if it has been waived.41
The records in P.W. v. M.S. were sought under a provision in the Massachusetts law that pierces the psychotherapist-patient privilege when
it is determined that a litigant’s records and the information contained
therein are relevant. The provision also requires a finding that, on
balance, piercing the privilege is more important to the welfare of the
child. The in camera review would assess that issue as well.42
D.

Limitations on Implied Waivers

The mere fact that privileged records have been successfully accessed by an adverse party does not necessarily mean that the communications lose their privileged status; unintended admission of priv38

Von Bulow, 828 F.2d at 101.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); see also
Zervos v. Verizon, 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2001).
40
P.W. v. M.S., 857 N.E.2d 38, 45 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); see also United
States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1996); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
41
P.W., 857 N.E.2d at 44-45; see also S.C. v. Guardian ad Litem, 845 So. 2d
953, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“Submitting the issue to the trial court for resolution in camera and giving the minor the opportunity to be heard is the least restrictive
or intrusive means of furthering a compelling state interest in acquiring the privileged
information.”).
42
P.W., 857 N.E.2d at 45.
39
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ileged communications generally will not result in implied waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In Usen v. Usen, for example,
the plaintiff wife’s medical and psychiatric records were admitted into
evidence pursuant to a statute allowing hospital records to be subpoenaed into court without violating hearsay rules.43 The purpose of the
statute was to allow the admission of evidence without requiring hospital personnel to come to court.44 However, the records contained
material that should have been protected by the psychotherapistpatient privilege.45 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held
that privileged records did not lose their privileged status merely because they were admitted as “public records.”46 Similarly, in Roberts
v. Superior Court, the defendant in a personal injury action sought
discovery of all of the plaintiff’s medical records, including her privileged psychiatric records.47 The records had earlier been provided to
her treating physicians and, through a discovery request (over her
objection), were revealed to the defendant.48 The defendant thereafter
successfully moved to compel production, but the California Supreme
Court reversed.49 The Court held that the inadvertent exchange of
psychotherapy records, intermingled with medical records, was not
sufficient to waive the privilege, since release of the privilege requires
the knowing and voluntary consent of the privilege-holder.50
The decision whether privileged communications, verbal or recorded, should be admitted into evidence to support a claim or defense
is a matter for the trial judge. If privileged communications are found
to have been partially disclosed, fairness may require waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege so as to conduct an effective crossexamination of the issues already raised.51 The court stated that, “the
fairness inquiry focuses on whether there is a ‘risk that some independent decision maker will accept [the privilege-holder’s] representations without the [adversary’s] having adequate opportunity to rebut
them.’”52
43
44

Usen v. Usen, 269 N.E.2d 442, 443-44 (Mass. 1971).
Id. at 443 (quoting Leonard v. Boston Elev. Ry., 125 N.E. 593, 593

(1920)).
45

See id.
Id. at 444.
47
Roberts v. Super. Ct., 508 P.2d 309, 311 (Cal. 1973).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 312.
50
Id. at 317.
51
Ruhlmann v. Ulster Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Services, 194 F.R.D. 445, 450
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
52
In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (alteration in original) (quoting John Doe
Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003).
46
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Even in those cases where privileged communications with a psychotherapist are directly put in issue, there may still be countervailing
policy reasons to exclude them. In In re Daniel C.H., a court of appeals in California reviewed a juvenile dependency proceeding in
which a father was accused of molesting his son.53 The father, denying the allegations of abuse and seeking to prove that the child’s
mother coached his disclosure, requested discovery of the child’s psychotherapy records.54 The court denied the father’s discovery request,
holding that a child does not put his mental state into issue and thus
forfeit his psychotherapist-patient privilege simply by reporting the
acts of molestation.55
II.

LIMITED, PARTIAL OR SELECTIVE WAIVER OF THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

A determination by the court that a party has impliedly waived her
psychotherapist-patient privilege still requires additional inquiry as to
the scope of that waiver. Courts do not agree on whether there can be
a less-than-complete waiver of the privilege, and, if so, which testimony or records fairly come within the scope of the waiver. There is
also no uniformity among courts as to the proper terminology for a
less-than-complete waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
and various courts refer to “limited,” “partial,” or “selective” waivers
of the privilege.56
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its state
equivalents provide that discovery will only be compelled for evidence that is relevant to the proceedings or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.57 Courts have been inconsistent in
their application of this rule to psychotherapeutic information. For
instance, in Rose v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Co., a federal district
court in Vermont construed the provision broadly.58 After holding
that the plaintiff impliedly waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege, it opened discovery of “matters causally or historically related”59

53

In re Daniel C.H , 269 Cal. Rptr. 624, 624 (Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 629.
55
Id.
56
See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293
F.3d 289, 294-302 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing limited, partial, and selective waiver of
the attorney-client privilege).
57
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
58
Rose v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:06-CV-211, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83029, at *3-4 (D. Vt. Nov. 8, 2007).
59
Id. at *6 (quoting Mattison v. Poulen, 353 A2d 327, 330 (Vt. 1976)).
54
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to the privileged information.60 Once the privilege has been waived,
the court may allow further discovery, including depositions of treatment providers, to ferret out relevant information, even that which
occurred prior or subsequent to the treatment that the patient revealed.61 In Mitchell v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., a federal district court in
Pennsylvania held that waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
could extend to all relevant communications on that subject, even to
those made to other psychotherapists.62
On the other hand, privilege provisions can also be construed narrowly. In Commonwealth v. Clancy,63 for example, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court examined whether and to what extent the following testimony, elicited from the prosecution’s witness by the prosecutor during direct examination, waived that witness’ psychotherapist-patient privilege:
THE PROSECUTOR: “Now, Mr. Doherty, I’m going
to ask you some personal questions now.”
. . .
THE PROSECUTOR: “And have you ever been treated for any mental condition?”
THE WITNESS: “Yes” . . . “I was in and out of mental health units for five or six—five times . . . .”
THE PROSECUTOR: “And do you know what you
were being treated for?”
THE WITNESS: “Nervous breakdown, depression and
alcoholism.”
THE PROSECUTOR: “And when were you first treated for alcoholism?”
THE WITNESS: “1981, I think.”
THE PROSECUTOR: “All right. And when were these hospitalizations you were talking about?”
THE WITNESS: “July of ‘82, October of ‘82, December, I was in the hospital over Christmas, and New
Year’s, December and part of January. April and
May—no, April and June.”64
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial court’s determination
that although the privilege did not protect the fact of a hospitalization,
60

Id. at *8.
See, e.g., Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co, 172 F.R.D. 627, 634-35
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
62
Mitchell v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 842 F. Supp. 158, 160 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
63
See Commonwealth v. Clancy, 524 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. 1988).
64
Id. at 397-98 n.3.
61
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the dates of hospitalization, or in some cases, even the purpose of the
admission, other information provided during direct examination constituted a partial waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege as to
that information.65 The Court also affirmed the trial court’s release to
defense counsel of the portion of the witness’ medical records relating
to the disclosed information, but denied access to the remainder of the
medical records because “the witness had . . . retained his privilege as
to all other communications contained within his medical records.”66
The Supreme Judicial Court found that this partial waiver and partial
limited release of related medical records was consistent with the
state’s general principle that “a witness does not relinquish all protection by merely testifying to events falling within the subject matter of
a privilege.”67 Similarly, in Jaffee, the U.S. Supreme Court intentionally limited the scope of such fishing expeditions:
A preexisting mental health condition does not entitle
a defendant access to a plaintiff’s entire mental health
history to fish for past stressors, trauma, diagnoses,
personality disorders, or other facts that could be used
to discredit the plaintiff. A defendant must make a
specific showing of the relevancy of such past records
to a claim or defense asserted by the parties, even if
the current treating psychotherapist created the records.68
It is important to note that the determination of whether privilege
exists needs to be addressed as a matter distinct from whether the privileged material is relevant to the issues in the litigation.69 In Johnson
v. Trujillo, the defendant in a personal injury claim sought to discover
mental health records from a marriage counselor relating to her recent
divorce and treatment for depression.70 Although the plaintiff had
made a “generic” claim in the personal injury action for mental suffering, the Colorado Supreme Court declined to waive her privilege,
holding that “relevance alone cannot be the test” in determining
whether a claim of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in a prior
65

Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added).
Id. at 398.
67
Id.
68
Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL
L. REV. 79, 141 (2008).
69
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 990, 997 (Mass. 1993); Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 771 N.E.2d 795, 801 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
70
Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 154 (Colo. 1999).
66
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action must be forfeited to pursue a subsequent personal injury action.71
Even if it is determined that the communications between a party
and her psychotherapist are protected by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, it still may be possible to admit into evidence the portions
of the psychotherapist’s records, or other records, that contain information that amounts to “conclusions based on objective indicia rather
than on any communications from the [patient].”72 Such collateral
information may include the fact that treatment was rendered, the
dates of treatment, certain diagnostic information, billing, and insurance records.73 Often the essential issue is whether such records disclose or reflect upon “patient communications,” and such determinations are subject to varying state rules regarding privilege.74
III.

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION TO, OR IN THE PRESENCE OF, THIRD
PARTIES

Voluntary waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege may occur in a number of ways. The first and most obvious is through a
knowing and voluntary execution of a release form. The second is
through a verbal authorization to disclose to third parties confidential
communications related to treatment.75 Under these circumstances
there is no longer an expectation of privacy, and the policy reasons
that support the psychotherapist-patient privilege no longer apply.
When a psychotherapist-patient communication is made in the
presence of a third party, or is voluntarily disclosed to a third party by
the privilege-holder outside the context of litigation, what is the effect
of such disclosure on privilege? Little law on the issue exists, as the
South Carolina Court of Appeals lamented in Carpenter v. Burr:

71

Id. at 157 (quoting R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 842 (Tex. 1994)).
Adoption of Seth, 560 N.E.2d 708, 713 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (quoting
Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)).
73
See, e.g., Adoption of Saul, 804 N.E.2d 359, 364-65 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004) (holding that diagnostic terms, costs, and dates of treatment are not privileged);
see also P.W. v. M.S., 857 N.E.2d 38, 44 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (quoting Adoption of
Seth, 560 N.E.2d at 713) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74
Compare Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006), and In
re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 640 (6th Cir. 1983), with In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces
Tecum, 638 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D. Me. 1986).
75
See, e.g., Hicks v. Talbott Recovery Sys., Inc., 196 F.3d 1226, 1238
(1999) (noting that the authorized release of a patient’s clinical record requires a
written designation by the patient).
72
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To date, we have found no decisions from the courts of
this State addressing the question of whether the “private” nature of communications from a patient to his
or her mental health treatment provider is compromised by the presence of a co-participant in the treatment when the communications at issue are made.76
In some cases, including Carpenter, a privilege-holder may invite a
third party to participate in a psychotherapy session. In other cases, a
third party may inadvertently overhear a privileged communication.
And, in still other cases, a party may voluntarily disclose privileged
communications with a psychotherapist to third persons such as
friends or family members at a time when no litigation is anticipated
or to employers, educational institutions, workers’ compensation carriers or others in the course of an unrelated transaction or litigation.
A general principle, to the extent that one exists, is that privileged
communications, when made in the presence of, or voluntarily disclosed to, third parties, result in an implied waiver of the privilege at
least as to those specific communications.77 The general rule, while
found in some statutes78 and cases,79 is neither universally accepted
nor uniformly construed across jurisdictions. When it is applied, it is
often narrowly construed, primarily limiting the waiver to those instances in which a third party was present, or the communications
were disclosed to a third party.80 The reasons for the general rule are
twofold: (1) as a matter of policy, the privilege should be waived because the privilege-holder, by permitting the presence of a third party,
did not intend that the communications be privileged; and (2) the non76

Carpenter v. Burr, 673 S.E. 2d 818, 824 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009).
See, e.g., United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is not absolute but only applicable to those
communications made in confidence with the expectation of privacy).
78
See MISS. R. EVID. 503(a)(4) (2011) (declaring that communications between a physician or psychotherapist are not privileged if disclosed to third parties not
participating in diagnosis and treatment).
79
As the Court in Jaffee pointed out, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
in many ways, analogous to the attorney-client privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518
U.S. 1, 10 (1996). To an extent then, it is not surprising to find that the general principle of implied waiver is similar to the attorney-client privilege. See In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A]ny voluntary disclosure by the client
to a third party breaches the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship and
therefore waives the privilege, not only as to the specific communication disclosed
but often as to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.”).
80
See Farrow v. Allen, 608 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (App. Div. 1993) (finding a partial
waiver of privilege where patient authorized psychiatrist to send letter to third party
revealing certain communications during treatment).
77
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party (to whom the communication was made) has no obligation of
confidentiality as to the privileged information and could either freely
communicate it to others or could be deposed about the information as
a fact witness.81
An alternate approach to determining whether the presence of, or
communication with, a third party destroys the privilege is to ascertain
by the totality of the circumstances whether the confidentiality of the
information was intended to be preserved. For example, in United
States v. Whitney a federal district court in Massachusetts held that the
presence of a parent during a privileged session between a psychotherapist and a minor child does not destroy the child’s privilege.82
Similarly, in Cabrera v. Cabrera, a Connecticut appeals court held
that the presence of family members at an adult psychotherapy session
did not waive the patient’s privilege.83 And, in People v. Deadmond,
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the presence of a third party
during a medical examination would not destroy the physician-patient
privilege if the patient intended that the examination be confidential.84
Finally, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is also widely recognized as applicable to communications made in marriage counseling
or group therapy sessions where multiple parties are routinely present.85
In those cases where privileged psychotherapist-patient information is voluntarily disclosed to third parties for a collateral purpose,
some courts have held that the privilege-holder forfeits the privilege
81
See, e.g., defendant’s argument in Sims v. State, 311 S.E.2d 161, 164 (Ga.
1984) (“Defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing to allow a psychiatrist to
testify to statements made by the victim during joint counseling sessions which both
the defendant and the victim attended.”); see also appellee Pogue’s argument in
Mrozinski v. Pogue, 423 S.E.2d 405, 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (“Appellee contends
that any communication to Pogue from Mrozinski lost its privileged status when
Pogue treated Mrozinski and his daughter jointly.”).
82
United States v. Whitney, No. 05-40005-FDS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
74522, at *7, *13-14 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2006).
83
Cabrera v. Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227, 1233-34 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
84
People v. Deadmond, 683 P.2d 763, 770-71 (Colo. 1984).
85
See, e.g., Touma v. Touma, 357 A.2d 25, 29, 30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976), (holding that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 45:8B, the presence of a third party in marriage counseling—the spouse—does not destroy the psychotherapist-patient privilege); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN, § 40.262(1) (West 2011) (“If both parties to a
marriage have obtained marital and family therapy by a licensed marital and family
therapist or a licensed counselor, the therapist or counselor shall not be competent to
testify in a domestic relations action other than child custody action concerning information acquired in the course of the therapeutic relationship unless both parties
consent.”); see also Lovett v. Super. Ct., 250 Cal. Rptr. 25, 28-29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that group therapy was privileged since participants were present to
further the interests of the treatment).
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as to future purposes. For instance, in John Doe v. Ensey, a tort action
was brought in a federal district court in Pennsylvania against two
priests who were accused of sexual abuse.86 After the allegations of
sexual abuse were made (but before suit was filed), the diocese sent
the priests for psychological evaluation with the expectation that the
findings of the evaluator would be disclosed to the Bishop and the
diocese.87 The plaintiffs in Ensey sought discovery of the evaluations.88 The court denied the defendants’ claim of privilege and allowed discovery of the reports because the evaluations were conducted with the expectation that the findings would be disclosed to third
persons.89 The court specifically noted, however, that discovery of the
privileged information is not necessarily dispositive on the issue of
whether the material would later be admissible.90 In State of Iowa v.
Heemstra, however, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that “a right as
valuable as a psychotherapist privilege should not be deemed to be
waived by implication except under the clearest of circumstances . . . .
[W]aiver in one proceeding is not a valid waiver in another.”91 In Ex
Parte Rudder, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the psychiatristpatient privilege was not waived where a patient provided records to
the Board of Medical Examiners since her disclosure to the Board was
considered confidential.92 In United States v. Hansen, a federal district court in Montana held that, although a deceased person (through
his estate) still maintains his psychotherapist-patient privilege, the
privilege would yield to public policy interests in a criminal matter
when the defense’s need for the privileged records outweighed the
defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.93 The fact that the privilege-holder was deceased was a factor to be considered in weighing
the competing needs of the parties.94
It is important to note that the wrongful or unauthorized disclosure of privileged information generally does not operate to waive a
patient’s privilege and would not be admissible.95 However, this does
86

John Doe v. Ensey, 220 F.R.D. 422, 423-24 (M.D. Pa. 2004).
Id. at 426-28.
88
Id. at 428.
89
Id.; see also Carrion v. City of New York, No. 01-CV-02255, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5991, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2002) (holding that the plaintiff in a tort
action waived his physician-patient privilege as to records that the plaintiff had produced).
90
Ensey, 220 F.R.D. at 428.
91
State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 560 (Iowa 2006).
92
Ex parte Rudder, 507 So. 2d 411, 413 (Ala. 1987).
93
United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mont. 1997).
94
Id.
95
See, e.g., Roberts v. Super. Ct., 508 P.2d 309, 316 (Cal. 1973). By the
same token, a psychotherapist cannot refuse to disclose privileged communications
87
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not apply to circumstances in which a party discloses privileged information pursuant to legal mandate, with or without the consent of
the privilege-holder. State laws require psychotherapists to report
matters of suspected child or elder abuse to state authorities notwithstanding any applicable privileges; additionally, threat of imminent
harm to the patient or a third party may require a psychotherapist to
disclose privileged information.96 In this circumstance, the fact that
some privileged information must be disclosed does not destroy the
privileged nature of the information, nor does it operate to waive the
patient’s privilege as to other material beyond the scope of the mandated report. In Menendez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
three audiotapes were seized from the defendants’ psychotherapist
during a murder investigation.97 The defendants sought to quash discovery on the basis that the tapes contained communications protected
by their psychotherapist-patient privilege.98 The California Supreme
Court held that the defendants’ psychotherapist-patient privilege was
waived because the psychotherapist had reasonable cause to believe
that the patients posed a risk of danger to themselves or others.99
Menendez follows a long line of case law and statutes that permit,
and usually mandate, a psychotherapist to notify authorities when a
patient poses an imminent risk of harm to himself or others.100 The
court in Menendez also held, however, that the “dangerous patient”
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege would limit disclosure of privileged communications to those psychotherapy sessions in
which the psychotherapist had reasonable cause to believe that disclosure was necessary to prevent future harm.101 Similarly, mandated
reporters of child abuse may violate psychotherapist-patient privilege
to disclose that information which is necessary to comply with the
under circumstances that the patient’s privilege has been waived because he believes
it constitutes an unnecessary intrusion in to the patient’s privacy. See In re Marriage
of Carol Meteer & Stephen Herr, No. B154682, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2409,
at *7 (Mar. 12, 2003).
96
Interestingly, the federal circuits are in disagreement as to whether communications made in the absence of a reasonable expectation of confidentiality should
nevertheless be privileged from disclosure. See United States v. Auster, 517 F.3d
312, 316-17, (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that
statements made in the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy are nevertheless privileged, whereas the Tenth Circuit has held that without a reasonable expectation of privacy, the privilege will yield).
97
Menendez v. Super. Ct., 834 P.2d 786, 789 (Cal. 1992).
98
Id. at 789.
99
Id. at 795, 800.
100
See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal.
1976); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 20B(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011).
101
Menendez, 834 P.2d at 795-96.
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reporting requirements of the state law.102 But, courts may not allow
the mandated report to become the basis of a fishing expedition for
other portions of a patient’s privileged communications.103
As a matter of procedure, the party seeking to establish waiver
generally carries the burden of proof. In Carrion v. City of New York,
for example, a federal district court allowed the plaintiff’s request for
disclosure of certain workers’ compensation records after he produced
a note referencing a particular examination in his claim. 104 The court
found that the plaintiff had waived his privilege “at least as to the records produced” and thereafter shifted the burden to the defendant to
demonstrate that additional records were necessary to “complete the
picture.”105
Whether parties can stipulate to limited or partial waivers of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is also an area which has received a
noticeable lack of attention from appellate courts. The few courts
which have discussed this issue seem to follow a similar course: the
privilege is waived as to the stipulated information, and the burden
shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate that the waiver should be
interpreted more broadly.106 In In re Marriage of Trepeck, a father
and mother stipulated that each would undergo a psychological evaluation as part of their child custody litigation. The custody evaluator
instructed as follows:
Both parties shall immediately sign any and all releases requested by the evaluator, either for themselves individually or for the children, to enable the evaluator
to gather information and/or to permit the evaluator to
speak with other persons including, but not limited to,
other mental health professionals who have been involved with either party or with the children . . . . The
parties acknowledge that they have been advised that
the psychotherapist-patient privilege does not apply to
the evaluation.107

102

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 § 51A(j) (West 2011).
See, e.g., People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 743-45 (Cal. 1983); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11171.2 (West 2011).
104
Carrion v. City of New York, No. 01-CV-02255, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5991, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2002).
105
Id. at *7, *11.
106
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Trepeck, No. D048190, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 2187, at *23-24 (Mar. 20, 2007).
107
Id.
103
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The mother complied with the stipulation and executed a release permitting the evaluator to speak to her psychotherapist.108 Thereafter,
the evaluator had a telephone conversation with the mother’s psychotherapist in furtherance of the psychological evaluation.109 The father
then subpoenaed the therapist to testify, arguing that the mother had
waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege “in its entirety” by signing the release.110 The trial court disagreed and granted the wife’s
motion to quash the subpoena, finding that the psychotherapist-patient
privilege was “a strong privilege” and that waiver of the privilege
could have a significantly chilling effect on therapy if so easily
waived.111 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision, finding that:
The language of the parties’ stipulation acknowledges
mother waived the privilege for purposes of [the]
evaluation, and no further. In our view, the waiver
was limited to the communications between mother’s
therapist and [the evaluator], matters much more narrow than the discovery sought by father’s subpoena.
Any broader construction in our view would substantially defeat the privacy afforded by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.112
Finally, related issues have arisen such as whether discovery requests for privileged psychotherapist-patient records should be subject
to a continuing disclosure requirement absent extraordinary circumstances, and whether communications that pertain to the pending litigation itself should be necessarily redacted. To the extent that the
psychotherapist-patient privilege was created to promote honest and
open therapeutic communications, it is difficult to imagine a more
intrusive mechanism to chill an ongoing psychotherapist-patient relationship. In Vasconcellos v. Cybex International, Inc., the defendant
sought ongoing discovery of the plaintiff’s psychiatric treatment.113
The federal district court in Maryland granted the plaintiff’s motion to

108

Id. at *23.
Id. at *27.
110
Id. at *23.
111
Id. at *25-26.
112
Id. at *24 (quoting Roberts v. Super. Ct., 508 P.2d 309, 317 (Cal. 1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
113
Vasconcellos v. Cybex Int’l, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 701, 707 (D. Md. 1997).
109
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quash citing “serious concerns that [further] disclosures w[ould] affect
. . . [plaintiff’s] psychiatric treatment.”114
Disputes involving matters such as forfeiture of a party’s psychotherapist-patient privilege necessarily involve a large measure of judicial discretion, and there is little consistency in the way courts view
the facts. Approaches vary from state to state and require case-bycase determinations that hold little precedential value.
IV.

THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
FAMILY COURT: THE ROLE OF THE GAL

The classic family courtroom drama over psychotherapist-patient
privilege often revolves around whether litigants put their mental
health at issue,115 or whether privilege should yield to the child’s welfare.116 Contested child custody proceedings often add another wrinkle to the analysis: whether the patient waives her privilege by authorizing the psychotherapist to be interviewed by a guardian ad litem
(GAL). A GAL is mental health professional or a lawyer appointed
by the court on an individual matter to investigate contested issues of
custody and visitation and report to the court concerning the best interest of minor children caught in the crossfire. Mental health providers can provide invaluable information for GAL investigations because they are often well aware of clinical information that bears significantly on a parent’s mental wellbeing, capacity to function, and
ability to meet their children’s needs.117 Likewise, a child’s mental
health provider often holds equally important information about the
child, such as whether the child is well settled in her current environment or fears one of her parents.118 Since many GALs are not mental
health professionals, the input of psychotherapists who know the
family is often invaluable to the investigative and decision-making
114

Id. at 708.
See, e.g,. In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008);see also In re Marriage of Carol Meteer & Stephen Herr, No. B154682, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
2409, at *6 (Mar. 12, 2003) (rejecting the “[h]usband’s theory that by filing the marital dissolution petition and requesting child custody, [w]ife waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege”).
116
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 20(B)(e) (West 2000 & Supp.
2011).
117
See Dana Royce Baerger et al., A Methodology for Reviewing the Reliability and Relevance of Child Custody Evaluations, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAW. 35, 47-48 (2002).
118
See Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children:
Following Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 335,
380 (2008).
115
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process. Thus, in the course of an investigation, a GAL will routinely
request access to any mental health providers involved with a family.119 Indeed, it is not unusual for GALs to be quite insistent in requesting access to mental health professionals; lawyers and clients
alike may be reluctant not to comply in light of the judicial authority
and unique role of the GAL. Because the information such professionals can provide is often so valuable, the GAL may be unsympathetic to a litigant who seeks to preserve the privacy of her therapeutic
relationships, even one that is ongoing. Few appellate courts have
ruled on whether authorizing one’s psychotherapist to be interviewed
by the GAL will necessarily result in an involuntary waiver of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege as to additional and follow-up information.
At least one appellate court has addressed the issue of waiver of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege where a party authorized her
therapist to be interviewed by a court-appointed custody evaluator
conducting a psychological evaluation of the parties. As discussed
above in In re Marriage of Trepeck, the father sought to subpoena the
mother’s psychotherapist based on a waiver of privilege after the
mother permitted the court-appointed evaluator to contact her psychotherapist and obtain privileged information for the purposes of the
evaluation.120 The trial court found that this authorization did not
result in a broad waiver of her privilege:
Mother did not place her mental state at issue in this
case nor is there any indication [that the evaluator] relied on information from Mother’s psychotherapist in
making his report. Neither party was deemed to have
mental problems that unduly interfered with a strong
commitment to their parenting roles. Public policy
dictates that the psychotherapist-patient privilege
should only be invaded under compelling circumstances which do not exist here.121
The court noted that the mother’s “authorization” had been obtained from the evaluator by means of a “generic form” which is “really designed to protect the evaluator so that he doesn’t get in trouble
119

See Dayle D. Deardurff, Representing the Interests of the Abused and
Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem and Access to Confidential Information, 11
U. DAYTON L. REV. 649, 651 (1986).
120
See In re Marriage of Trepeck, No. D048190, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 2187 at *19 (Mar. 20, 2007).
121
Id. at *5-6.
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for contacting the therapist.”122 The court alluded to, but did not elaborate upon, the coercive circumstances of the authorization.
The New York case Farrow v. Allen illustrates a related issue
concerning the effect of partial waiver of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.123 In Farrow, the patient authorized his psychiatrist to send
a letter to a third-party revealing specific, privileged communications
made during the course of treatment to be included in a report to the
Yale/New Haven Sexual Abuse Clinic.124 The court, concluding that
waiver of the privilege had occurred by virtue of sending the letter,
held that the patient’s authorization to send a letter to a third party
“completely unconnected to his or her treatment and who is not subject to any privilege” would cause the communication to “no longer
be considered a confidence” and, thus, the privilege was waived.125
As to whether the letter constituted a partial or full waiver of the privilege, the Court concluded that since the report was not used in any
ongoing litigation that would result in prejudice to another party, partial waiver was the appropriate remedy.126
Had the psychiatrist in Farrow written a letter to a GAL, the likely result would be that the GAL would seek to interview the psychiatrist. If the patient were unwilling to authorize the interview, the GAL
would probably refuse to include the information contained in the
letter since the psychiatrist would not be available to provide a complete picture. If the patient were willing to allow the psychiatrist to
divulge privileged communications to the GAL, the court would be
faced with the issue set forth in Trepeck: whether such disclosure to
the GAL implicitly waives the psychotherapist-patient privilege, in
whole or in part.
A potential risk for a party authorizing a psychotherapist to be interviewed by a GAL is that the party risks putting her mental health in
the spotlight where it may not have been previously challenged in the
litigation. Indeed, in states such as Massachusetts,127 which provide a
statutory process for waiving the patient-psychotherapist privilege in
child custody cases, there is a risk that revealing treatment by a psychotherapist can result in the court permitting the disclosure of additional information. Massachusetts law provides that the patientpsychotherapist privilege does not apply in child custody cases where
the judge determines “that the psychotherapist has evidence bearing
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at *25.
Farrow v. Allen, 608 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (App. Div. 1993).
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 5.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233 § 20(B)(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011).
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significantly on the patient’s ability to provide suitable care or custody, and that it is more important to the welfare of the child that the
communication be disclosed than that the relationship between patient
and psychotherapist be protected.”128 In P.W. v. M.S.,129 a Massachusetts appeals court held that a party seeking visitation or custody of a
child could be required to release his records to the GAL, recognizing
they eventually may also wind up in the hands of the parties, if relevant to the contested issues.130 Cases such as P.W. v. M.S. appear to
be the exception, however, and courts generally accord substantial
deference to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Absent an inadvertent waiver of the privilege or allegations of serious mental health
issues that might impact a parent’s ability to care for minor children
(present in P.W. v. M.S.),131 the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
generally preserved.132
V.

THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
FAMILY COURT: USE OF MENTAL EXAMINATIONS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO PIERCING THE PSYCHOTHERAPISTPATIENT PRIVILEGE

A GAL who seeks mental health information concerning one or
both parties and does not have the benefit of an available psychotherapist to interview (either because there is no psychotherapist or the
privilege has not been waived) may seek to require one, and usually
both, parties to undergo a psychological examination or submit to
psychological testing to address the mental health concerns. The parties can either stipulate to such an examination, or either party or the
GAL can seek an order of the court compelling such an examination.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and most state and
family court equivalents, provide that “[t]he court where the action is
pending may order a party whose mental or physical condition . . . is
in controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination.”133 This
rule also provides that “the party examined waives any privilege it
128

Id.
See P.W. v. M.S., 857 N.E.2d 38, 45 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006);
130
Id. (holding that the privilege of a father in a custody dispute as to therapist and related records could nonetheless be waived if the judge determined, after an
in camera review of the information, that the disclosure would be in the child’s best
interests).
131
Id. at 40 (“[F]ather suffered from severe emotional difficulties; he attempted suicide in April, 2004.”).
132
See Usen v. Usen, 269 N.E.2d 442, 442 (Mass. 1971).
133
FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
129
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may have—in that action or any other action involving the same controversy—concerning . . . all examinations of the same condition.”134
The psychologist administering the testing should specifically advise
the patient—and seek acknowledgment—that the test results will not
be privileged.135
A “mental examination” may consist of a relatively brief clinical
evaluation or more comprehensive psychological testing. These evaluations generally provide some useful data to the court about a party’s
psychological functioning while avoiding the perils associated with
piercing a party’s psychotherapist-patient privilege. It is important to
note, however, that if psychological testing were being conducted for
purposes of treatment, the examiner would generally consult an ongoing psychotherapist to interpret the objective test results in light of
reliable clinical data. However, where the psychological evaluation or
testing is conducted pursuant to a court order, a party generally seeks
to avoid the participation of a psychotherapist if one even exists. A
party would only voluntarily waive her psychotherapist-patient privilege (and allow a consult with her psychotherapist) if doing so were
expected to provide some sort of strategic advantage. If, for example,
a party presents for mental examination appearing disorganized or
even paranoid, an ongoing psychotherapist may be able to provide
context for the paranoid or disorganized presentation. On the other
hand, a high-functioning, albeit mentally-compromised party may
successfully “prepare” for psychological testing and influence the
results to appear healthier than she actually is—a finding that a longterm psychotherapist would likely dispute if asked.
Psychological testing is generally more rigorous than a clinical
examination and involves an assessment of mental and emotional
functioning via clinician-administered psychological testing instruments, both written and oral, in addition to self-reports, behavioral
observations, and diagnostic interviews.136 Commonly used instruments for testing parents include a personality assessment such as the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI),137 measures of
134

FED. R. CIV. P. 35(b)(4). As noted above, some scholars have interpreted
the language of the rule to mean that “in effect, the rule provides that a release to one
person regarding the plaintiff’s condition is a release to all regarding the same condition.” See Greenberg, supra note 39.
135
Commonwealth v. Lamb, 360 N.E.2d 307, 310 (Mass. 1977) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Lamb, 311 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1974)); see also In re Laura L., 768
N.E.2d 605, 608-09 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).
136
Gary R. Geffken et al., Parental Adherence to Child’s Psychologists’
Recommendations from Psychological Testing, 37 PROF. PSYCHOL. 499, 499 (2006).
137
A concise description of the MMPI can be found in the New Jersey District Court case McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (D. N.J. 1978) (“The
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cognitive functioning such as intelligence tests,138 and sometimes projective testing such as the Rorschach139 or the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT).140 Testing of children may involve the adolescent version
of the MMPI, Family Drawing or Kinetic Family Drawing,141 and
[MMPI] consists of approximately 550 numbered statements in booklet form with
printed instructions on the cover . . . . An individual taking the inventory reads the
instructions and proceeds through the test without being observed or questioned by a
psychologist. The MMPI is thus described as a self-administered, self-report inventory . . . . The individual is instructed to read each statement and to try to decide whether it is true or mostly true or false, or not usually true, as applied to him; items which
the individual finds not applicable or on which he has no judgment are left blank.
Answers are recorded on a separate answer sheet by marking in true or false columns.
The statements in the inventory range over several areas and refer to opinions, attitudes, observable behavior, and feelings which the subject may find applicable to
himself. Answers to certain groups of questions are collected according to ten basic
scales, each scale representing a personality characteristic, such as paranoia or depression. Scale numbers are listed on a graph or profile for comparison to other subject groups.”).
138
Examples include the Woodcock-Johnson Tests of Cognitive Abilities-III
and the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales V. See Marc J. Ackerman & Tracy Brey
Pritzi, Child Custody Evaluation Practices: A 20 year Follow Up, 49 FAM. CT. REV.
618, 621 (2011).
139
McKenna also includes a short summary of the Rorschach test. McKenna,
451 F. Supp. at 1360 (“The Rorschach test consists of a set series of pictures of inkblots, usually ten in number. The cards range in color from all black and gray to others having several pastel colors . . . . The irregular form of the inkblots permits innumerable interpretations, and the vague shapes are roughly suggestive of things ranging from animals to sexual organs. The responses are analyzed in several ways, including, for example, by content, parts of the blot used, or perception of movement . .
. . Interpretation of the responses provides information about emotional and personality traits.”).
140
For a short summary of TAT see id. (“[TAT] requires a subject to interpret
a picture by telling or writing a dramatic story about what has led up to the event in
the picture, what is happening, and what the possible outcome might be . . . . The
responses are interpreted primarily by analysis of any recurring themes behind the
plots, and the way in which the subject uses aspects of the picture to form the story.
From a total set of 20 pictures, fewer cards may be used, although different pictures
are normally used for men and women.”).
141
See Irving v. State, 705 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Lawrence, J., dissenting). In this case, a clinical psychologist described the kinetic family
drawing test as follows:
The kinetic family drawing test is very simple. The instructions are simply
you ask the child to draw me a picture of their family, of them and their
family, with everyone doing something and to not draw stick figures. And
that’s all. The logic of that is the child tends to project, that’s why we call
them projective tests, project concepts of themselves or their attitudes or
their concepts of the people involved into various dimensions of the drawing which can be extremely helpful with children.
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TAT or Children’s Apperception Test (CAT).142 Parent inventories
such as the Parent-Child Relationship Index and custody batteries
such as the Ackerman-Schoendorf Scales for Parent Evaluation of
Custody (ASPECT)143 are increasingly gaining popularity amongst
some evaluators,144 if for no other reason, than to bring another measure of objectivity into the evaluation.
For decades, scholars have noted that “[t]ests that assess psychopathology, emotional functioning, personality styles, and behavior
patterns may be of some value in child custody evaluations to the degree that they provide information about the parents’ relationships
with, and their ability to relate to their children, or provide information about the children’s needs.”145 Far from a novel use of these
instruments, there is some empirical evidence that psychological testing by custody evaluators is actually used more frequently than collateral contact with psychotherapists. Indeed, a 2001 study done by
Quinnell and Bow found that approximately 91 percent of 198 mental
health practitioners surveyed performed psychological testing on parents and children as part of completing a child custody evaluation,
compared to the 86 percent who contacted the psychotherapist.146
Increasingly, courts also rely upon psychological testing (rather
than privileged psychotherapist-patient communications) in making
their custody and visitation determinations. The Family Court of Delaware, for example, dedicated a substantial portion of its 58 page custody opinion in Martin v. Martin to reviewing the psychological tests
administered to the mother, father, and children in that case to support
its decision.147 The Martin court meticulously reviewed the data from
the MMPI, human figure drawing, family drawing, Bender Visual/Motor Gestalt test, Rotter Incomplete Sentences—Adult Form, and
the Rorschach in support of its allocation of custody, parenting time,
and visitation between the mother and the father.148
142

Francella A. Quinnell & James N. Bow, Psychological Tests Used in Child
Custody Evaluations, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 491, 496 (2001).
143
ASPECT is “a rating instrument designed to assess parent fitness in custody evaluations.
It incorporates many standard intelligence, personality/psychopathology, and academic achievement measures with the examiner’s observations and interviews of the parents and children.” Randy K. Otto & James N.
Butcher, Computer-Assisted Psychological Assessment in Child Custody Evaluations,
29 FAM. L. Q. 79, 90 (1995).
144
Quinnell & Bow, supra note 142, at 497.
145
Otto & Butcher, supra note 143.
146
James N. Bow & Francella A. Quinnell, Psychologists’ Current Practices
and Procedures in Child Custody Evaluations: Five Years After American Psychological Association Guidelines, 32 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 261, 264 tbl. 2 (2001).
147
Martin v. Martin, 820 A.2d 410, 416-17 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2002).
148
Id. at 417-18.
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Proponents of psychological testing argue that the tests provide
objective data upon which to build and support the evaluator’s opinions and may help “balance bias and potential errors in clinical interviews.”149 Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court commented as follows:
In many cases, information obtained from psychological evaluations prepared for the purpose of litigation is
more helpful to the court than would be information
obtained from the parents’ prior treatment records [because] [s]uch evaluations focus specifically on parental ability, whereas prior therapy may have had nothing to do with parenting.150
Significantly, such testing permits the GAL to gather psychological
data without compromising a party’s psychotherapist-patient privilege
or jeopardizing the preexisting relationship with the party’s mental
health provider. In Adoption of Abigail, for instance, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals noted that admitting the written report and testimony of two clinical psychologists who examined and tested a
mother in connection with a termination of parental rights proceeding
did not impinge upon the mother’s psychotherapist-patient privilege
because the psychologists’ conclusions were “based on objective indicia rather than on communications from the mother.”151 Courts in
California,152 Connecticut,153 Florida,154 Idaho,155 Missouri,156 New

149

Quinnell & Bow, supra note 142, at 491.
Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 579 (N.J. 1997) (citation omitted).
151
Adoption of Abigail, 499 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
152
See Simek v. Super. Ct., 172 Cal. Rptr. 564, 568-69 (Ct. App. 1981) (preferring court-ordered mental examination over piercing the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in a child custody proceeding).
153
Cabrera v. Cabrera, 580 A.2d 1227, 1233 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) (expert
psychiatric witness was most appropriate source of information regarding parent’s
mental health rather than records of treating psychologist).
154
Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654, 656 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (noting
that the court has mental examinations as an alternate tool in child custody cases).
155
Barker v. Barker, 440 P.2d 137, 139 (Idaho 1968) (declining to hold psychological-patient privilege waived automatically in child custody litigation, indicating court-ordered psychological examination was proper avenue to obtain this data).
156
Husgen v. Stussie, 617 S.W.2d 414, 416-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (deciding
that proper source of psychological information regarding a parent in a child custody
proceeding is a mental examination rather than by piercing the psychologist-patient
privilege).
150
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Jersey,157 and New York158 have come to the same conclusion. A
Florida court specifically commented:
We recognize that in a child custody case the mental
health of a parent may be a relevant issue. Where this
issue is raised the trial court must maintain a proper
balance, determining on the one hand the mental
health of the parents as this relates to the best interest
of the child, and on the other maintaining confidentiality between a treating psychiatrist and his patient. The
court in this case has an alternate tool which may accomplish both purposes. Upon proper motion the
court may order a compulsory psychiatric examination.159
The data generated through psychological testing may be different
from that which is offered by a psychotherapist, although ideally, a
psychological tester would incorporate information from a treating
psychotherapist when available. Whether this “objective” data is
more or less useful is subject to debate, but it provides a reasonable
alternative to an unauthorized piercing of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.
The benefits of psychological testing in child custody evaluations
as a source of valuable information are not universally acclaimed.
Skeptics remind us that most psychological testing instruments were
developed in the therapeutic context and, as a result, may not generate
reliable data in the forensic child custody evaluation context.160 For
example, although the MMPI may detect paranoia,161 it cannot tell the

157

Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 584 (N.J. 1997) (requiring court to
examine “whether all other sources of information available to the court are adequate
to justify adjudication of the custody and visitation issues without resort to the plaintiff’s therapy records”).
158
Perry v. Fiumano, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386-87 (App. Div. 1978) (requiring
a showing that information gleaned from evaluation is inadequate to resolve child
custody issue).
159
Roper, 336 So. 2d at 656-57.
160
Kirk Heilbrun, The Role of Psychological Testing in Forensic Assessment,
16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 257, 258 (1992).
161
See, e.g., Jean M. Twenge et al., Birth Cohort Increases in Psychopathology among Young Americans, 1938-2007: A Cross-Temporal Meta-Analysis of the
MMPI, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 145, 149 (2010). Indeed, since the 1940s, the
MMPI has been and continues to be one of the most popular psychological inventories and is used widely not only in child custody disputes, but also in job profiling and
correctional contexts because of the MMPI’s validity in “predicting and describing
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tester whether that paranoia is justified or reasonable under the circumstances; only a detailed history of the patient’s mental health,
preferably including data from a patient’s mental health provider, can
help the evaluator decipher this complex question. Further, psychological testing in lieu of talking to a mental health provider may give
only a snapshot of the individual at the time the tests were administered rather than a longitudinal perspective.162 Additionally, since
psychological tests are administered and assessed over a relatively
short term (typical of child custody evaluations), they are susceptible
to deliberate attempts by the testee to influence or deceive the test,
resulting in poor reliability.163 Nevertheless, the availability of psychological testing allows courts to obtain necessary data without unnecessarily invading a valuable relationship rooted in privacy and
confidentiality.
VI.

WAIVER OF A CHILD’S PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE

In the context of child custody evaluations, mental health providers who treat the children involved often can provide insights into the
wellbeing and best interests of the children. Of course, such information is also protected by the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege. And while parents generally are the decision makers for their
minor child’s health needs and have access to the child’s medical records,164 some courts have held that when the child is the subject of the
litigation, the parents are no longer the presumptive privilege-holders
for their child.165 As a result, waiver of a child’s psychotherapistpatient privilege is often fraught not only with therapeutic complications, but also specific procedural requirements.

psychopathic symptoms, job performance, and countless behaviors and profiles.” Id.
at 148.
162
See Heilbrun, supra note 160, at 263.
163
See id.
164
“Where a child is too young or otherwise is unable to engage in meaningful consultation about the merits of waiving a privilege, it is permissible for a court to
permit a parent to waive (or refuse to waive) the privilege on the child’s behalf.”
Commonwealth v. Pelosi, 771 N.E.2d 795, 810 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
165
See, e.g., Carney v. Carney, 525 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding a
co-tutor or a legal representative cannot assert a minor child’s privilege in custody
proceeding to prevent disclosure of child’s statement to a professional); Nagle v.
Hooks, 460 A.2d 49 (Md. 1983) (holding that a parent could not assert child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege in a custody proceeding).
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In many states, the family courts have special procedures for determining whether a minor child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege
will be waived or preserved, thus affecting whether sensitive information held by the child’s psychotherapist will be available to the
GAL and the court for use in the custody dispute. In Kansas and
Maryland, for example, a special GAL is appointed to determine
whether the child’s psychotherapist privilege should be waived or
asserted.166 The task of this “privilege GAL” varies, but generally it is
to assess the following: (1) whether the child is mature enough to appreciate the issue of waiver; (2) if so, the preferences of the child; (3)
the benefit of preserving psychotherapeutic confidences, if any; (4)
the value of the information held by the psychotherapist to the proceeding; and (5) sometimes, the balance of the child’s need for privacy with the court’s need for the information.167 In some cases, the
only relevant issue is the preference of a mature child. In states such
as New Hampshire, an existing GAL is empowered to make this determination.168 In other states, there is little or no protection at all for
the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege, as the courts routinely
grant the GAL broad access to children’s mental health records.169
CONCLUSION
The law recognizes the value of maintaining the privacy of communications between a patient and her psychotherapist which relate to
the “diagnosis or treatment” of the individual’s “mental or emotional
condition.”170 This evidentiary shield applies in court, administrative,
166
See In re Zappa, 631 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (child’s GAL
may assert or waive the child’s privilege in a proceeding involving the termination of
parental rights); Nagle, 460 A.2d at 50 (holding that the court should appoint a GAL
to determine if waiver of the child’s privilege is in his best interest).
167
See generally Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F. Freitas,
Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian Ad Litem Practice, 13 J. LAW & FAM.
STUD. 43, 58-61 (2011).
168
In re Berg, 886 A.2d 980, 988 (N.H. 2005).
169
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 3610 (2010) (“Upon presentation of
the order of appointment by the Court-Appointed Special Advocate, any agency,
hospital, school, organization, division or department of the State, doctor, nurse or
other health care provider, treatment facility, psychologist, psychiatrist, police department or mental health clinic shall permit the Advocate to inspect and copy any
records relating to the child or children and parents involved in the case of appointment without consent of the child or children or parents.”).
170
See, e.g. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 20B (West 2000 & Supp. 2011),
which defines “communications” as including “conversations, correspondence, actions and occurrences relating to diagnosis or treatment before, during or after institutionalization, regardless of the patient’s awareness of such conversations, correspond-
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or legislative proceedings,171 and is predicated upon the public policy
goal of protecting “the justifiable expectations of confidentiality that
most individuals seeking psychotherapeutic treatment harbor.” The
privilege shields a patient’s “thoughts, feelings, and impressions” as
well as the “substance of the psychotherapeutic dialogue”172 and must
be affirmatively asserted or it is waived. The law that has evolved
around the exercise of this privilege is complex and far from uniform
around the country. In most cases, the goal is to balance the imperative of confidentiality with the need to disclose useful information.
While case-by-case determination is often inevitable, a significant
body of case law has developed that provides valuable guidance to
this important inquiry.

ence, actions and occurrences, and any records, memoranda or notes of the foregoing.”
171
Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 760 N.E.2d 724, 728-29 (Mass. 2002)
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 20B).
172
Commonwealth v. Kobrin, 479 N.E.2d 674, 681 (1985).

